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A B S T R A C T
Academic and policy literatures are seeing a growing discussion about ‘clean energy disruption’. However, the
term disruption often lacks deﬁnitional clarity. Departing from the concept of disruptive innovation and based
on a review of ﬁrm-based management and socio-technical transitions literatures, we derive four dimensions of
system disruption: technology, markets and business models, ownership and actors, and regulation. We apply
these dimensions to analyse the status of disruption in two exemplary countries pursuing ambitious low-carbon
energy transitions: Germany and the United Kingdom (UK). The views of a diverse range of actors are in-
vestigated regarding how disruption is unfolding and what is seen as disruptive in the energy sector. Our analysis
draws on 28 expert interviews, supplemented with a review of empirical studies. We ﬁnd that despite com-
parable shares of renewables in the two countries' electricity systems, the scale of disruption in Germany sig-
niﬁcantly exceeds that in the UK, covering all four rather than just two dimensions. We also ﬁnd a greater
awareness of and resistance to expected further waves of disruption in Germany, as compared to the UK. Finally,
we discuss the implications of the notion of disruption for understanding and governing socio-technical tran-
sitions.
1. Introduction
Transitions advancing a low-carbon future are imperative to meet
the demands of the Paris Agreement and stay below 1.5 °C of global
temperature rise [1,2]. Eﬀorts are increasingly centring around how
low-carbon transitions can be accelerated [3,4]. Energy is a key sector
for these transitions, as it accounts for around 40% of global
CO2emissions [5]. Given the urgency of the climate change challenge,
incremental change towards low-carbon energy systems is too slow and,
thus, a more radical ‘disruption’ of incumbent fossil fuel based energy
systems is needed [6,7].
The notion of ‘clean energy disruption’ has become widespread,
typically referring to the transformative potential of a range of tech-
nological solutions. These include decentralised renewable energy
technologies, smart demand response, the electriﬁcation of mobility,
and digitisation and automation, as well as their combinations [8].
Building on Christensen's notion of ‘disruptive innovation’ (1997), the
literature has largely focused on novel technologies and business
models rather than system-level changes. To advance low-carbon
transitions rapidly, we argue that bridging the conceptualisations of
system-level transitions and disruptive innovations can generate new
insights into how energy transitions unfold, and what eﬀects they have
alongside CO2 emission reductions. Alongside Wilson and Tyﬁeld [9],
we, thus, argue that focusing only on technologies and business models
makes limited use of the concept of disruption for analysing energy
transitions. Thus, we extend Christensen's understanding by drawing on
the literature of socio-technical transitions [10–12]. In the context of
transitions, disruptive innovations are novel value propositions in the
market [13] that derive from niche technologies [11,12] and have
disruptive potential in the system [14], resulting in signiﬁcant im-
provements in environmental sustainability. We deﬁne disruption in the
system as radical interference in one or more of the elements of a sta-
bilised socio-technical system, causing pressure to alter the system
more than incrementally towards improved sustainability.
The term ‘disruption’ has been used in high level policy discussions
in Germany [15], the United Kingdom (UK) [16], and the European
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Union (EU) [17], but also in the popular press [18]. However, ‘dis-
ruption’ is somewhat of a ‘buzzword’ [19,20] and suﬀers from deﬁni-
tional challenges [19,21–24]. Regardless, the term is used to denote
occurring or anticipated change in energy at the systemic level. It is,
therefore, important to understand in what ways disruption in diﬀerent
contexts is perceived to occur. In this article, we focus on systemic
understandings of ‘disruption’ rather than discrete ‘disruptive innova-
tions’.
Based on previous literature, we create a framework for analysing
diﬀerent dimensions of disruption in socio-technical systems. We then
analyse what kind of disruption (if any) has occurred in the socio-
technical energy systems of Germany and the UK, to highlight diﬀer-
ences in the extent to which diﬀerent forms of disruption are occurring
in the ongoing energy transitions. Based on 28 interviews with key
stakeholders, we explore how actors perceive the changes taking place
in the energy sector, and whether they regard such changes as dis-
ruptive. We also use already published material on energy transitions in
these countries to understand the nature of systemic disruption. We
oﬀer a descriptive account on the nature of disruption in each country
to move beyond ‘uniform’ and often normatively-loaded accounts of
disruption [25]. Such an analysis can help to identify points of dis-
ruption, for policymakers and others, to design strategies how to alle-
viate tensions, avoid the negative eﬀects of disruptive transitions (e.g.
unemployment or social exclusion) and advance “just transitions” (cf.
[26] by targeted strategies addressing diﬀerent dimensions.
In Section 2, we derive our analytical framework combining ideas
from ﬁrm-based management and socio-technical transition literatures.
This is followed by our research case (Section 3) and the methodolo-
gical approach (Section 4). Findings are presented in Section 5 and
discussed in Section 6. We close by drawing policy implications for
governing low-carbon transitions faced with potentially disruptive
changes.
2. Disruption in socio-technical transitions: towards a systemic
understanding
2.1. Disruption and energy transitions
In the context of rapidly diﬀusing renewable energy technologies
there is a growing discussion on the need for ‘disruption’ in the global
energy sector [18,27]. Interest is burgeoning in the potential role of
disruptive low-carbon innovations in driving socio-technical transitions
[28].
Seba describes energy disruption in terms of how technologies such
as solar, battery storage and electric vehicles will fundamentally alter
the ‘energy architecture’ of our lives, moving away from a resource-
based system to an information-based one. This new architecture is
based on an increased role for the consumer in being able to produce
energy, leading to the demise of the traditional energy utility [8]. We
argue that this rapid deployment of low-carbon technologies can too
easily be labelled as ‘disruptive’ without suﬃcient consideration for the
diﬀerent dimensions and geographical unevenness of ‘disruption’.
Much discussion on clean energy disruption builds on the ﬁrm-
based management literature on disruptive technologies and innovation
[29–31]. It argues that leading ﬁrms have been slow to react to tech-
nological changes catering to new customer wants and expectations,
and as a consequence their market share and existing revenue streams
have been signiﬁcantly disrupted [32]. In this discussion, a plethora of
recent technological developments have been identiﬁed as disruptive
from electric vehicles to electronic cigarettes [33,11,34–37]. However,
the term has been criticised for lacking deﬁnitional clarity, being vague
and unhelpful [19,38,21,20,24]. From the sustainability transitions
perspective, important is the altered production characteristics (lower
emissions) of disruptive innovation [28]. The service to the consumer
may be the same (e.g. electricity, heat, shelter) or diﬀerent (e.g. new
mobility services instead of private cars), and the organisation
centralised or decentralised. However, these characteristics may inﬂu-
ence the acceptability or legitimacy of the innovation and, hence, the
speed of diﬀusion.
Recently, it has been noted that disruption could also be considered
at the energy system level using a socio-technical perspective [9]. Yet,
while some work that is focussed on energy systems has built on
Schumpeterian insights regarding the ‘creative destructive’ forces of
innovation [39], most studies in this area seldom refer explicitly to
‘disruption’. Amongst the exceptions, Rosenbloom [14] describes how
disruption involves a power shift from incumbents to new entrants or
actors from other socio-technical systems, a change that may concur
with institutional or technological changes, such as phase-out subsidies
and new technology rollout commitments. Dijk et al. [11] argues that
disruptive market innovation connects to regime transition or diversi-
ﬁcation. Geels [12] identiﬁes disruption in socio-technical systems in
terms of (rapid) speed of change. Diﬀering from that, Lindberg et al.
[40] connect it to the magnitude of change: "the degree of disruption…
is about whether there will be more or less profound changes in the
basic architecture of the socio-technical system."
To understand better the factors thought to make low-carbon energy
transitions disruptive in Germany and the UK, we build on a combi-
nation of the ﬁrm-based management literature with the socio-technical
transitions literature to analyse disruption at the systemic level. First,
we posit that certain key dimensions of disruption can be derived from
an in-depth reading of the ﬁrm-based literature on disruptive innova-
tion, including but also extending beyond the early work of Christensen
[30,41,38,42,11,43–46]. Second, the meaning of these dimensions can
be interpreted in a more system-oriented way, through insights from
the transitions literature [47]. Such an interdisciplinary interpretation
of the dimensions of system disruption may oﬀer a useful means of
comparing and contrasting the disruptive qualities of socio-technical
transitions, taking place in diﬀerent sectoral and geographical contexts,
to gain a better understanding of the consequences of diﬀerent transi-
tion pathways in terms of which industries and actors beneﬁt from
disruptive processes and which are hindered by these changes. Con-
necting processes of disruption to systemic change chimes with broader
work that seeks to connect meso-level activities around sustainability to
system-level developments, noting that there is usually a disconnection
between these diﬀerent levels of analysis [48–51]
Given that the term disruption is increasingly used, more empiri-
cally nuanced understandings are necessary to illuminate how parti-
cular processes of low-carbon energy transitions may be more or less
disruptive. Not least, associated questions are of some importance in the
design of eﬀective and adaptive policy [52]. Considerations regarding
‘just’ energy transitions [26] require paying attention not only to the
environmental eﬀects but also to how transitions can advance energy
democracy or socially just changes. The dimensions of disruption that
we outline below oﬀer a streamlined way of identifying key empirical
diﬀerences between socio-technical transitions towards low-carbon fu-
tures in diﬀerent settings.
2.2. Towards an analytical framework for assessing dimensions and status
of system disruption
Drawing from the ﬁrm-based management and the socio-technical
transitions literatures we created an analytical framework that identi-
ﬁes four dimensions at which a socio-technical system may be dis-
rupted: (1) technology, (2) ownership and actors, (3) markets and
business models, and (4) regulation (see Table 1). The dimensions are
interrelated but, for analytical purposes, we foreground what we argue
to be usefully distinguishable but sometimes also competing under-
standings of disruption. Together, they allow for assessing the status of
system disruption in a more nuanced and empirical manner.
2.2.1. Dimension 1: technology
The ﬁrst dimension of disruption is ‘technology’. It addresses how
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particular new technologies, or technological or engineering eﬀects,
can be considered disruptive to the existing dominating system. This
relates to how the qualities of a technology operate in diﬀerent ways
compared to existing established technologies, and how their novel
characteristics pose potential problems for existing technologies and
associated systems [29]. A classic example is the physical diﬀerence
between digital music enabling a speed, sharing, and transfer of music
which ‘hard copy’ music could not deliver [36]. The transitions litera-
ture diﬀerentiates between niche and regime technologies. For the
latter, technological development occurs along trajectories within es-
tablished technological paradigms [53] or socio-technical regimes [54].
In contrast, the former need nurturing and shielding in protective
spaces to be able to develop [55,56] and then to (perhaps) disrupt the
dominant regime.
Energy-related examples of potentially disruptive technologies in-
clude wind, solar, tidal and wave power, and associated micro-grids
and storage solutions. These (niche) technologies ﬁt with a decen-
tralised energy system with intermittent renewable technologies, where
energy might be produced closer to consumption and becomes more
responsive to variable patterns of supply and demand [57]. This con-
trasts with the established centralised energy system with large, geo-
graphically remote and constantly running plants. Alongside possible
beneﬁcial eﬀects like the strengthening of power quality or the ﬂat-
tening of peak demand, disruptive eﬀects from a technological per-
spective may manifest in various ways, including how intermittent
generation can also amplify spikes and troughs in the matching of
supply and demand. Additionally, the physical infrastructure of the
electricity grid may require signiﬁcant transformation to accommodate
and integrate these new technologies as part of ‘grid modernisation’
[58].
2.2.2. Dimension 2: ownership and actors
The second dimension of disruption, ‘ownership and actors’, covers
two interrelated aspects: (a) changes in who owns assets; and (b) the
emergence of new kinds of actors in energy provision and services.
Early contributions on disruption identiﬁed that, because incumbents
were focussed on optimising their existing products and catering to
existing consumers, they would be unwilling to invest in new disruptive
technologies and, as a consequence, new actors would be likely to ap-
pear [32,44]. The transitions literature highlights a range of ‘dis-
tributed’ actors beyond ﬁrms, and focuses on their diﬀerent ‘strategies
and resources’, and how ownership models in niches may come to
challenge incumbent forms of ownership [59].
Indeed, new forms of ownership have emerged around renewable
energy, contrasting the traditional utility model, including energy co-
operatives and community energy [60,61], linking to issues of energy
democracy and justice [62,63]. In addition, start-up companies may
increase their inﬂuence over incumbent utilities [8]. Incumbents can
also actively ﬁght back, aiming to reduce competition from new players
and expand their portfolio to renewable energy technologies [64,65].
Understanding ownership structures and the role of actors in energy
transitions can unfold the politics behind processes of energy disrup-
tion. For example, Baker and Phillips [66] found that reconﬁgurations
of national electricity sectors as a consequence of disruptive technolo-
gies are facing signiﬁcant political and economic challenges rooted in
countries’ socio-economic context, such as ownership models and dis-
tribution inequalities, with important implications for the directionality
and long-term success of energy transition. Unfolding the actors' con-
stellations and the ownership models characterizing energy systems and
their disruption provides signiﬁcant insights into how institutional
settings can eﬀectively respond to social and technological drivers for
low-carbon energy transitions.
2.2.3. Dimension 3: markets and business models
The third dimension of disruption is ‘markets and business models’,
recognising that a change in the dominant business models can have a
radical eﬀect on the market shares of incumbent companies [31].
Business models are understood as stemming from ‘value propositions’
and the design of a “product or service that helps customers get a job
done more eﬀectively, conveniently, and aﬀordably” ([60]: 1331). The
transitions literature recognises that business models tend to become
aligned as technological regimes stabilise, and diﬀering ﬁrms conform
to similar or complementary business models [67]. This alignment
process makes it challenging for niche business models that capture
value in diﬀerent or incompatible ways to expand beyond the niche
[49].
Changes in business models can have disruptive eﬀects on the en-
ergy market, where new approaches to ‘capture value’ (e.g., through
creating more demand-responsive tariﬀs that ﬁt within the ﬂuctuating
energy prices) are created in connection to intermittent renewables
[68,11,69]. The increasing deployment of renewables has been argued
to pose a ‘threat’ to existing companies’ business models, because new
business models that provide a range of services (rather than the tra-
ditional energy commodity) will become increasingly important [70].
The transitions literature addresses also the broader role of market
structure, the design of incentives and pricing – and how these factors
may, in turn, inﬂuence changes in the business models of individual
ﬁrms or utilities [11,71].
2.2.4. Dimension 4: regulation
‘Regulation’ is the fourth dimension we consider. Regulatory fra-
meworks may not be able to keep pace with disruptive innovation [72]
and are challenged as a result [73]. Regulation may also constitute a
barrier to experimental solutions advancing low-carbon transitions
[74]. Disruptive innovation may raise signiﬁcant public policy con-
cerns, creating demands for new forms of regulation [75]. For example,
new ‘platform’ industries, such as Uber and AirBnB, have challenged
existing regulatory frameworks designed for public transport and the
hotel trade as well as employment [76], resulting in changing regula-
tions in these areas. The transitions literature argues that, if niches are
nurtured and supported adequately, they can diﬀuse and potentially
destabilise existing regulations and governance arrangements around
Table 1
Dimensions of disruption in transitions.
Dimension of disruption Explanation
Technology - Novel technology disrupting dominating technology and infrastructure by diﬀerentiated qualities
- Requires initial shielding from mainstream selection pressures
Ownership and actors - Emergence of new actors in production and supply
- Changing ownership of assets (in terms of kind of actors), with implications on justice and democracy
- Incumbent actors’ reduced inﬂuence or ﬁght back
Markets and business models - New value propositions and ways to capture value
- Reducing market share of incumbent companies
- New entrants and new business models from incumbents (connected to the actor dimension)
Regulation - Dis-alignments between disruptive innovation and existing regulation, calling for regulatory change
- Regulatory interventions to intentionally disrupt non-sustainable systems
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incumbent actors [77]. Regulatory changes may also be used to pave
way for disruption at the system level [39]. For example, in the con-
struction industry, regulatory intervention via changed building per-
formance standards can seek to shape ﬁrms’ technological and product
competences and established practices in a disruptive manner [78].
In the energy sector, regulators in charge of managing transmission
and distribution networks face signiﬁcant challenges because of de-
centralised and intermittent renewable energy. These include dis-
patching responsibilities and a greater diversity of actors producing
electricity rather than monopolistic vertically integrated utilities which
established regulatory frameworks were based on [79,80]. Further, the
digitisation of energy systems creates new challenges that are likely to
require a massive regulatory overhaul.
3. Empirical case
Germany and the UK are large European countries (populations of
82.7 million and 65.6 million respectively) with ambitious long-term
greenhouse gas reduction targets for 2050, with Germany aiming for a
reduction by 80–95% [81] and the UK by 80% [82], compared to 1990.
However, the pursued instrument mixes and the countries' dec-
arbonisation pathways diﬀer signiﬁcantly [83].
3.1. Germany
Germany is known for its "Energiewende" and its share of overall
renewable energy in electricity generation has increased from 5% in
1990 to 31% in 2015 [84,85]. Onshore wind, bioenergy, waste energy,
and solar PV have been the dominant renewable energy technologies
(Figs. 1 and 2). Despite CO2 emission reductions, Germany's continued
reliance on domestically mined lignite presents a notable climate
change challenge [86]. The decarbonisation of heat also faces con-
siderable challenges [87] and the decarbonisation of transport is sig-
niﬁcantly lagging behind electricity and heat [88]. Germany remains
the largest contributor of GHG emissions in Europe, and without the
implementation of additional climate policies will miss its 40% CO2
emissions reduction target for 2020 [89].
To understand Germany's unique decarbonisation pathway it is
imperative to remember the country's long-standing public opposition
movement towards nuclear power. Politically, this bottom up move-
ment has manifested itself in a strong presence of the Green Party
[90,91] which was fundamental to the adoption of the ‘Nuclear Exit
Law’ in 2000. While nuclear phase-out was reconsidered by Merkel's
government in 2010, after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011,
Merkel implemented the nuclear phase-out by 2022 with cross-party
support [92], giving the expansion of renewable energies additional
momentum [93].
The growth of Germany's renewable energy portfolio is largely a
result of long-term policy commitments. In the 1990s, a number of
instruments were set to encourage the expansion of renewable energy
[94], including the ‘10,000 roofs programme’ updated to ‘100,000 roofs
programme’ to promote the deployment of solar power [95,96]. In
2000, the ‘Red-Green’ coalition government adopted the Renewable
Energy Sources Act (EEG) which has become the core policy for ac-
celerating the energy transition [97]. The EEG introduced technology-
speciﬁc feed-in-tariﬀs guaranteed for a period of 20 years and priority
access to the grid. It has been regularly amended to reﬂect socio-tech-
nical developments (e.g. drop in PV prices) and changing socio-political
priorities (e.g. switch to auctions and introduction of expansion corri-
dors) [98,99].
3.2. United Kingdom
In the UK, the share of renewable energy in electricity generation
has increased from around 1% in 1990 to nearly 27% in 2015 [100]
Most of this growth has materialised in oﬀshore wind and bioenergy
(Figs. 3 and 4). In addition, much coal generation was replaced by gas
within the ‘dash for gas’ in the 1990s [101], leading to signiﬁcant
emissions reductions. Similar to Germany, the decarbonisation of heat
and transport face considerable challenges and shares of renewable
energy in these sectors have remained low [102]. There are concerns
that the UK is not on track to meet its fourth carbon budget commit-
ments of reducing emissions by 51% by 2025 albeit signiﬁcant ad-
vances made in decarbonising power supply [103].
Changes in the electricity generation mix have resulted from a
variety of factors [101]. Notably, the UK set the world's ﬁrst legally
binding climate change mitigation plan, the Climate Change Act in
2008 [104]. Renewable energy has been supported during the last three
decades through various policies, including the Non-Fossil Fuel Ob-
ligation (1991), the Renewables Obligation (2002), Feed-in-Tariﬀs
(2008), and Contracts for Diﬀerence (2013). The UK also introduced a
Carbon Floor Price in 2013 [105] which somewhat compensates the
weak price signals from the EU Emissions Trading System. In 2017, the
country committed to phase out unabated coal generation by 2025,
being amongst the ﬁrst to make such a commitment [106,107].
Fig. 1. German electricity production 1990 (%).
Source: IEA [100].
Fig. 2. German electricity production 2015 (%).
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Simultaneously, contrary energy policy developments prevail: the UK is
the only country in Europe that actively pursues and invests in hy-
draulic ‘fracking’ of natural gas, and it has the most ambitious nuclear
new build agenda of the developed world [108] while the global nu-
clear industry is in decline [109].
4. Empirical research method
In our empirical investigation of disruption, we used in-depth in-
terviews as the primary data source. Selecting interviewees from a
variety of backgrounds, interviews were used as systemic evidence
[110] to analyse energy disruption. Expert interviews were conducted
during November 2016–March 2017 by the ﬁrst and second author,
comprising 15 interviews in Germany and 13 in the UK. Interviewees
were selected to represent diﬀerent types of actor groups with sig-
niﬁcant expertise on the energy sector (Table 2).
The data collection was based on a semi-structured interview guide,
with questions on the interviewees’ views of what disruptive changes (if
any) had occurred in the country's energy system and prospects for
upcoming disruptions. Open-ended questions were followed up by
prompts arising from the analytical framework pertaining to the four
dimensions of disruption. All interviews were recorded, transcribed
verbatim and the German ones translated into English.
For the data analysis, the authors jointly developed an initial coding
framework based on the analytical framework. This initial coding fra-
mework was then reﬁned on the basis of test coding. The aim of the test
coding process was “that a single knowledgeable coder may be rea-
sonably conﬁdent that his or her coding would be reproducible by other
equally knowledgeable coders”, i.e. intercoder reliability, and reconciling
discrepancies in coding by achieving intercoder agreement ([111]: 297).
Test coding was carried out by ﬁve authors coding one interview in-
dividually, followed by a joint discussion to compare coding, revise the
coding framework, and agree on a uniform interpretation of codes. To
enhance the reliability of our analysis we conducted two further rounds
of comparative coding until a satisfactory coherence in the interpreta-
tion of the codes and the coding procedure was achieved and a ﬁnal list
of codes was agreed upon. Based on this, subsequently, the ﬁrst author
coded all interviews in NVivo.
To obtain an initial impression of the data, we ranked the codes
according to their frequency of occurrence. The ﬁrst author then cre-
ated an Excel sheet containing all codes pertaining to the analytical
framework in which, for each interviewee, he summarised their per-
ception of the status of disruption for the four dimensions in the fra-
mework. This assessment was discussed with the second and third au-
thors, considering alternative explanations and going back to the
original interviews when needed. The assessment was then ﬁne-tuned
accordingly, based on which for each code the ﬁrst author derived the
overall ﬁndings across all interviewees. This was again scrutinised by
the second and third author in joint discussions on the overall inter-
pretation of the ﬁndings. Based on these, the ﬁrst author then con-
solidated the Excel table, which served as basis for writing up our
ﬁndings.
Rather than taking the responses of interviewees purely at face
value, we triangulated the interview ﬁndings by scrutinising them with
secondary data. For this, the ﬁrst author conducted a literature review
based around the key words of “disruption”, “disruptive innovation”
and “energy transition” combined with “Germany” and “UK” in Science
Direct, Scopus, and Google Scholar. For each country, this resulted in a
list of over 30 peer-reviewed articles, reports, and policy documents
focussed on disruption in the context of energy transitions. This em-
pirical literature provided important contextual information regarding
each case study country, which allowed triangulation of emerging in-
terview ﬁndings in terms of the dimensions of disruption under ques-
tion.
5. Findings on dimensions of disruption in the German and UK
energy transitions
5.1. Disruption in Germany
For the electricity sector, a majority of the German interviewees (12
of 15) diﬀerentiated between a ‘ﬁrst wave’ of disruption that has al-
ready happened (hitherto referred to as the ﬁrst electricity disruption)
and an impending ‘next wave’ of disruption (second electricity disrup-
tion). In addition, ﬁve interviewees also outlined a disruption set to take
place in other associated sectors (cross-sectoral disruption). In the fol-
lowing section, we present the extent of perceived disruption for all
Fig. 3. UK electricity production 1990 (%).
Source: IEA [100].
Fig. 4. UK electricity production 2015 (%).
Table 2
Interviewee categories and number of interviewees per country.
Interview category Germany United Kingdom
Research 3 (DE1, DE3, DE7) 1 (UK1)
Industry Association 4 (DE8, DE9, DE10,
DE14)
4 (UK3, UK5, UK12
UK13)
Trade Union 1 (DE15) 1 (UK7)
Ministry/ Politician 3 (DE2, DE12, DE13) 4 (UK2, UK4, UK10,
UK11)
Utility 1 (DE4) 1 (UK8)
Think tank/ NGO 1 (DE5) 2 (UK6, UK9)
Total number of interviews 15 13
Total duration of interviews 19.8 h 13.6 h
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four dimensions and how these were discussed in relation to the three
waves of disruption in Germany.
5.1.1. Dimension 1: technology
5.1.1.1. First electricity disruption. Changes in electricity supply through
the increasing penetration of renewable energy sources (mainly
onshore wind and solar) was identiﬁed by all 15 respondents. The
decentralisation of energy technologies was mentioned as an important
feature of disruption, with repercussions on the grid infrastructure (7
interviewees). One interviewee highlighted that disruption had been
generated only by decentralised low carbon technologies: “not large-
scale renewables – that is oﬀshore wind or larger biomass plants – but
rather…decentralised plants” (DE3, Research). The German electricity
system was previously based around large power plants feeding
electricity directly into the transmission grid, but with increasing
decentralised generation, “the distribution network has become
increasingly important.” (DE9, Industry Association).
5.1.1.2. Second electricity disruption. Seven interviewees viewed that
storage technologies are pivotal to the second wave of disruption. The
reason behind this is the intermittent nature of renewables which
represents a key technical challenge for which solutions, such as storage
and load shifting, are required to enable the further expansion of
renewables [112]. The second wave would in part be driven by
technological change revolving around storage, where “the key drivers
are coming rather from the spheres of technology…when storage batteries
are cheaper than PV modules, then it'll go by itself” (DE4, Utility).
Regarding further decentralisation of electricity, missing storage
solutions were identiﬁed as a potential barrier: “…the necessary
infrastructure is lacking for handling the rising volume of renewables. This
includes storage” (DE2, Ministry).
Digitisation was identiﬁed as an important part of the second wave
(ﬁve interviewees). Views were, however, contradictory regarding its
importance. One interviewee saw that “the whole ﬁeld of digitisation is
really setting out right now…” (DE13, Ministry) and another pointed out
that “something that might be disruptive…with regard to the future, is the
issue of digitisation” (DE8, Industry Association). It was also stressed that
the possibilities enabled by digitisation could be hyped, and that digi-
tisation as such was not driving disruption: “Digitisation is a tool… It's
like Uber without cars or Airbnb without apartments. It's ﬁrst of all necessary
to roll out the hardware” (DE4, Utility).
5.1.1.3. Cross-sectoral disruption. The potential coupling of electricity
and mobility systems received attention from eight interviewees.
Electro-mobility was one of the main technological developments
mentioned (ﬁve interviewees), with the disruption yet to occur.
“Electro-mobility is certainly – also because of the great importance of the
automobile industry in Germany – the next disruptive case” (DE12,
Ministry). In this context, the importance of batteries or hydrogen
was highlighted. However, four interviewees indicated that progress on
electro-mobility had been slow: “in Germany the transformation to
electro-mobility is lagging strongly behind other countries…because simply
the car companies are so powerful that they prevent legislation” (DE7,
Research); illustrating the interdependencies between technology,
actors, markets and regulation. These four interviewees highlighted
that resistance by incumbents to further waves of disruption through
electric vehicle rollout is signiﬁcant, with the dominance of the German
automotive sector being a key reason for this.
The disruption of sectors, such as mobility combined with the
second electricity disruption through digitisation and storage, would
lead to divisions between diﬀerent sectors dissolving with new cross-
sectoral applications of innovations. An interviewee stated that “at the
moment there are many, many parallel developments…if that [electric ve-
hicles] really diﬀuses, then it will have an unbelievably great impact on the
energy system, and that doesn't even have to do anything with energy, but
with mobility” (DE3, Think Tank). This issue of ‘sector coupling’ was
discussed by ﬁve interviewees, and was seen not only in relation to
electrifying mobility but also heat. As one interviewee stated regarding
household generation: “many, many people have now started…to install
PV roof units and similar things everywhere. They are saying, if I can gen-
erate up to 70 per cent of my own electricity demand with a relatively af-
fordable storage unit, and can also signiﬁcantly support my heating needs
with it [PV], then I'll do it.” (DE9, Industry Association).
5.1.2. Dimension 2: ownership and actors
5.1.2.1. First electricity disruption. The ﬁrst electricity disruption was
primarily driven by new actors (9 interviewees), including start-up
companies, individual households (particularly through the
development of PV), farmers, and energy cooperatives that now have
a signiﬁcant stake in the energy system. The energy system was
‘challenged’ “…in the regard that it suddenly became possible that a
variety of decentralised actors play a role” (DE15, Trade Union).
Ownership structures were a crucial consideration, with the energy
cooperative movement being a main driver of the initial wave of
disruption (identiﬁed by ﬁve interviewees). The role of citizen-led
energy cooperatives and community energy groups in changing the
ownership structure of German electricity generation is well
documented [60,113,91,114,115]. In Germany there are over 1000
energy cooperatives [116] and around 51% of Germany's renewable
capacity is owned by citizens and farmers [117,114].
5.1.2.2. Second electricity disruption. A key theme that emerged in the
interviews was that those actors that have traditionally owned
electricity production capacity (utilities) may not own it in the future.
The increased role of the consumer and households as key actors could
further erode the revenue base of conventional utilities (seven
interviewees). In the second wave, there would be more actors
involved in driving energy policy: “I see that investments will be taken
much more by new actors, also, by very heterogeneous actors, by people, by
individual households.” (DE11, Research). With the move towards the
provision of energy services tailored to the needs of these ‘prosumers’,
and changes such as digitisation and the importance of information in
general, four interviewees highlighted that new actors may enter the
energy scene from the IT and services sector: “the other key word…is:
platform economy, that is the Googles, Facebooks of this world, who
penetrate areas that have formerly been the domains of the public utilities,
with the marketing structure that they have, because they…have a close
relation to the customers” (DE13, Ministry).
The direction of the second wave of disruption is, however, un-
certain. Four interviewees saw a role for incumbent companies parti-
cularly in relation to technologies like oﬀshore wind: “there will prob-
ably also be centralisation again, not back to a small circle [the ‘big four’]…
but to a somewhat smaller circle [of large utilities]. I mean, oﬀshore, for
example, these are of course really big infrastructure projects that only big
energy suppliers can really manage” (DE8, Industry Association).
Commitments to a ‘diversity’ of actors still seems to be important in the
German context: “there was a task force ‘Akteursvielfalt’ [actor diversity]
in the BMWi [Ministry of Economic Aﬀairs], where they gathered many
diﬀerent actors over several months and looked at how the tendering system
can be designed in a way that the broad participation can be maintained”
(DE14, Industry Association). These discussions relate to the policy
change from feed-in-tariﬀs to tendering in the EEG but more broadly
also to ongoing developments and debates regarding the German
Energiewende where future scenarios could be more centralised or
decentralised, depending on key policy decisions and socio-technical
developments in the next few years [118].
5.1.2.3. Cross-sectoral disruption. Four interviewees highlighted
disruptive changes to ownership and actors that were potentially on
the horizon for the German automotive industry, due to changes
particularly related to competition from abroad that could disrupt
German companies' lead role: “There clearly will be disruption in the car
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manufacturing industry…I am afraid that Germany might suﬀer on this
disruptive transformation of the mobility sector” (DE7, Research). Similar
to how German utilities were caught oﬀ guard or reacted too slowly to
the rise of renewable energy, the same trend may occur in relation to
car manufacturing: “you get a bit afraid that a similar thing will happen
with the automotive industry, and that a similar thing will happen with the
chemical industry” (DE5, Think tank). This relates to new actors
emerging on the scene in other countries that are said to be dominant
both in terms of production and market share. For example, China is
producing 43% of the world's electric vehicles compared to Germany at
23% [119], and companies such as Tesla from the USA are important
competitors in electric vehicles. Finally, the increased role of the
consumer was related to new business models to facilitate cross-
sectoral solutions at the household level through the integration of
electricity, heat and transport (5 interviewees).
5.1.3. Dimension 3: market and business models
5.1.3.1. First electricity disruption. The disruption of existing business
models of incumbent companies through the merit order eﬀect1 has
already been established in the literature [70,121] and was conﬁrmed
by eight interviewees. With speciﬁc reference to big utilities like RWE
and E.ON, a civil servant described the consequences for utilities of
“volumes of renewable electricity that had ﬂooded the system” whereby
“traditional power stations encountered problems and had to be shut down,
the power exchange price fell and utility companies’ business models were
suddenly called into question” (DE2, Ministry). Consequently, traditional
utilities have split their organisational structure between conventional
and renewable supply and are searching for new business models in
order to survive. “You see this in the splitting up of E.ON and RWE. They
have now realised that those pushing the old business ideas are no longer
advancing” (DE 1, Research).
5.1.3.2. Second electricity disruption. Related to the technological
developments, such as digitisation, automation and storage, comes
the question of business models in which consumers play a stronger
role, highlighted by seven interviewees. This "new downstream
development" (DE3, Research) is building on decentralised variable
generation and a greater role for consumers. Thereby, it requires
incumbents to reformulate their business models for the ‘second
wave’: “There's a radical change on the horizon, and the major players
are thinking about how to stay in business” (DE2, Ministry). An
interviewee from a utility company described this reorientation with
“close customer contact” in which they need to be able to “react very
quickly to customers’ desires” (DE4, Utility). It was pointed out that a lack
of growth in traditional markets would be a key driver for such a
reorientation, including the search for new strategic partners: “if we ﬁnd
that traditional markets aren't enjoying growth anymore …then we will have
to consider whether to expand our portfolio to include this kind of business…
or we can join forces with others…who already have the right customer
contacts” (DE4, Utility).
The interrelated nature of the dimensions of disruption is ex-
empliﬁed by the foreseen key role of the consumer inﬂuencing business
models towards a focus on the provision of energy services, rather than
the direct sale of electricity or devices: “I think that the current business
model is going to change [..] we think that in the future the money will be
made rather by providing the right services than by selling devices” (DE10,
Industry Association). This also related to the rise of storage and digi-
tisation enabling more eﬃcient delivery of services, which may un-
dercut traditional utilities further. An interviewee questioned whether
“the margins that many municipal utilities have today [can] be preserved in
the medium term as supplier changes, tariﬀ levels, and the purchase and
supply of energy become increasingly automated and digitised, and the only
things that matter are eﬃcient processes and not much else” (DE1,
Research).
5.1.3.3. Cross-sectoral disruption. E-mobility is thought to impact on
household energy services and to interlink with issues around storage:
“regarding ﬂexibility, electro-mobility has also a certain role as energy
storage and ﬂexibility option in this context” (DE12, Ministry). Emphasis
was also placed on ‘start-ups’ oﬀering a range of services across sectors:
“many start-ups doing all kinds of things, such as aggregation, metering,
charging station ideas and storage facility construction, of which there is
today much more due to sector coupling. This is a very big topic [..] mobility,
heating, ﬂexibility and digitisation” (DE9, Industry Association). This
quote shows the interrelated nature of diﬀering dimensions of
disruption as technological and business model factors align. So,
disruptions in diﬀerent sectors are likely to join up as cross-sectoral
changes and new companies may focus on business models that
integrate a range of services across sectors.
5.1.4. Dimension 4: regulation
5.1.4.1. First electricity disruption. In the context of the ﬁrst electricity
disruption, regulation was mentioned by six interviewees. The rapid
deployment of renewables on the grid has disrupted the usual
regulatory practice due to more tasks for regulatory agencies. In
response, more dialogue is required between policy makers and
regulatory bodies. One interviewee stated that due to the rapid
growth of onshore wind and solar, there have been additional
pressures placed on grid operators and the Federal Network Agency
(Bundesnetzagentur, BNetzA), leading to changes. An interviewee from
a Government Ministry noted that “the role…[of the regulator]…has
changed massively”, where more dialogue between policy makers and
regulator is now required to manage the changes underway. Further,
“…due to the enormous changes in the energy system we are in a – often
critical, in fact – dialogue: how far does this go? What are the political
guidelines?” (DE 13, Ministry).
These challenges have led to a number of regulatory changes.
Amongst others, more cooperation mechanisms have been established
between diﬀerent grid operators, particularly around the increasing
need for “re-dispatch” that has “forced them to change how they work”
(DE 6, Research). As a consequence, information-sharing and commu-
nication have increased between grid operators, changing the usual
regulatory arrangements: “…there's more cooperation across grid opera-
tors to ensure that stability can be maintained at a reasonable cost” (DE6,
Research). That is, the German energy transition has created new de-
mands from regulators, leading to “…the addition of many, many tasks
for the regulatory authority” (DE10, Industry Association). For example,
“The Federal Network Agency was very active in raising certain eﬃciency
potentials with network operators and improving certain processes. The
market for balancing energy has become much more eﬃcient” (DE1,
Research).
5.1.4.2. Second electricity disruption. Regulation was seen as a barrier
for the second electricity disruption, because a new regulatory
framework, tailored to a more ﬂexible and decentralised electricity
system, was missing (7 interviewees). “I do think that the Energy Industry
Act (EnWG) in its current state has to be reviewed… you'd have to ask
yourself if all the regulations that were mainly made for a centralised system
do still ﬁt in the new system”, because “drivers for the network expansion
are less and less coming from the level of the transmission grid, but rather
from the consumer side” (DE10, Industry Association). Another
interviewee outlined the problems of developing regulatory
frameworks to integrate new electricity producers: “…what does this
actually mean for the integration into the electricity market from the
perspectives of all these grid operators? …Is it the public utility that is
active in the region and makes single contracts with – I don't know – 20,000
individual PV-plant operators? How is that supposed to work? So, this
question: how do we integrate those into the electricity market in the future?”
1 The Merit-Order Eﬀect refers to “the lowering of power prices at the elec-
tricity exchange due to an increased supply of renewable energies” [120].
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(DE14, Industry Association).
In relation to storage, “the regulatory framework conditions are simply
missing” (DE8, Industry Association). For digitisation, “…the pace of the
regulation can be seen as an obstacle” (DE10, Industry Association). This
broader regulatory challenge was also recognised by a civil servant: "It
[the regulatory framework] is still too rigid and still has too much of an old-
world approach, a purely distributive network function, and too little func-
tion as a highway from below for decentralised generation and distribution
and aggregation, storage and ﬂexibility. There's still too little of this function
in [the BNetzA]. It deﬁnitely has to do something. And the Network Agency
knows this" (DE13, Ministry).
5.1.4.3. Cross-sectoral disruption. Pressures on regulatory frameworks
through increasing sectoral integration were a theme discussed by four
interviewees. One interviewee highlighted that a careful approach to
regulating changes was being taken: “With sector coupling there are two
completely new areas coming in – heat and transport… But where we are
deliberately moving very, very carefully and considerately, to say: can we
really ﬁnd a good access point? Or are we making a mistake if we create
certain situations that we won't be able to control later on?” (DE13,
Ministry). Another interviewee highlights current regulatory barriers
linking to wind, where “in terms of sector coupling…here we of course
have to choose other systems. There we come up against regulatory barriers.
If I want to use electricity for heating, i.e. power to heat, and have to pay a
string of duties, then that's diﬃcult.” (DE4, Utility). While data was more
limited on this topic, initial signs show that the regulatory conditions
require adaptation to facilitate further sectoral integration, which will,
in turn, aﬀect other dimensions of disruption, including business
models.
5.2. Disruption in the UK
The majority of interviewees from the UK (7 of 13) felt there had
been ‘some’ disruption in the UK electricity system, while a minority
(3/13) felt there had been no signiﬁcant disruption. Five interviewees
underlined a key period where disruption was beginning to take place,
during 2010–2015. However, following signiﬁcant policy changes
taking place in 2015 disruption was being curtailed. We unpack this
perceived status of a contested disruption below.
5.2.1. Dimension 1: technology
While all thirteen interviewees noted the growth in low-carbon
generation over the past ten years, ﬁve interviewees pointed out that
this had largely been based around oﬀshore wind, whereas decen-
tralised renewables had only grown more rapidly since the UK estab-
lished Feed-in-Tariﬀs in 2010. Consequently, eight interviewees per-
ceived that technological disruption had not occurred despite the
growth of renewables. One respondent put it simply: “I don't think we
have seen the disruption from genuinely decentralised renewables just yet”
(UK5, Think tank).
However, some disruptive challenges to the national grid caused by
the growth of intermittent renewables was recognised by ﬁve inter-
viewees. For example, one interviewee pointed out the ‘voltage pro-
blem’ where “the changes that have been taking place over the last ten years
have led to a change of characteristics such that now there are hours and
hours and hours of the year when the voltage is going up and up heading – I
think they got up to 419 kV. The operational limit is 420kV” (UK10,
Regulation). These concerns have also been raised in the 'System
Operability Framework' documents produced by the National Grid,
which highlight the technical challenges at the grid level posed by
variable supply and more demand led policies [122].
Finally, four interviewees mentioned the roll-out of ‘smart meters’
which would see digital technology being used to facilitate a greater
role of the consumer in the energy system and which has been a key
focus of the UK government [123,124].
5.2.2. Dimension 2: ownership and actors
‘Big players’, i.e. incumbent energy suppliers, still dominated the
energy system (5 interviewees). While the market share of incumbent
utility companies, ‘the big six’, had reduced from around 100% in 2008
to 85% by 2015, the prevalence of new ownership models around re-
newable energy is notably low [125]. As noted by one interviewee, “a
large part of the industry is very monopolistic” (UK10, Ministry) and has
remained in place. This was contrasted with other European countries:
“in Germany […] if you look at the way their PV is distributed, it is across a
huge number of organisations – your Bavarian farmers, this sort of stuﬀ
–whereas in the UK, it is much more utility-scale, big solar farms.” (UK3,
Industry Association).
The small penetration of community energy schemes was also
mentioned by four interviewees: “Community and locally owned stuﬀ has
not become a signiﬁcant part of the system in the way that it has in Germany,
and that reﬂects the politics” (UK5, Think Tank). In 2014, the UK ministry
in charge of energy policy launched a national Community Energy
Strategy, signifying “remarkable recognition of grassroots initiatives in
sustainable energy”, while it has still to a large degree remained a
grassroots activity ([126]: 408) .
5.2.3. Dimension 3: market and business models
The interviews pointed to the electricity market in the UK still being
dominated by the 'big six'. As stated by one interviewee “electricity
policy is essentially dominated by the perceived need to basically base our
electricity system around a relatively small number of relatively large gen-
erating sets, which hasn't changed since the ‘50s” (UK9, Think tank). New
market players struggle to gain hold unlike in countries, such as
Germany, where incumbent business models have been put under
substantial pressure by new players [127,128]. One interviewee noted
that the lack of a ‘ﬂexibility’ market2 in the UK was an issue preventing
innovation in business models around energy provision: “We don't have
competition in the wholesale market. That's a major barrier…and on top of
that we've layered all these auxiliary services, and a capacity market outside
an already imperfect market structure. It is a very bad picture from an in-
novation point of view” (UK8, Utility).
Five interviewees pointed out that further disruption of business
models may be on the horizon with new policies supporting increased
roles for consumers. In relation to the rollout of ‘Smart Meters’ one
interviewee noted that “the more that we get the concept of Smart Meters
and beyond Smart Meters, where there's going to be interaction between
consumer and system… that's where I think the innovation [in business
models] will happen” (UK4, Ministry). Similarly, recent overarching
policy developments have, rhetorically at least, committed to un-
leashing new business models that enhance the role of the consumer
and to supporting new actors through R&D and other resources rather
than just incumbents [130].
5.2.4. Dimension 4: regulation
The potential disruption of the regulatory frameworks designed by
the Oﬃce of Gas and Electricity Markets (OFGEM) in which the grid
operator, the National Grid, carries out its functions, was discussed by
ﬁve interviewees. Grid regulation is increasingly being put under
pressure by decentralised and household forms of energy production
like solar, eﬃciency and electric vehicles: a “new governance framework”
is needed because “…for example…electric vehicle manufacturers coming
along with really neat apps so that you can charge your car at the best price
2 A power system with an increasing share of intermittent renewable gen-
eration entails certain risks and uncertainties. This requires policy makers to
incentivise ﬂexibility and the ability to adapt to changes in levels of power
production and demand. This includes ﬁnancial incentives for utilising energy
at certain times in the day to match supply and demand, and developing
business models based around solutions including thermostat-based demand
response, aggregators, and small storage providers [129].
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or the lowest carbon or whatever you want. Potentially, those parties could
shut down the National Grid” (UK10, Ministry). An interviewee saw that
there was not a ‘system architect’ in place that could oversee this ac-
tivity, because the National Grid oversees the transmission network,
whereas distribution networks play a largely passive role (UK10,
Ministry).
Another interviewee pointed out that, with the growth of renew-
ables and climate change concerns, regulation had substantially
changed to a direction, where government played more of a role in
directing regulatory frameworks: “The way we regulate and govern the
electricity sector, compared with, say, 1998 when full competition was ﬁ-
nally introduced, is unrecognisable” (UK1, Research). However, the
period of potentially disruptive regulation for decentralised renewable
energy technologies (2010–2015) was rather short-lived, limiting the
extent of disruption in markets and business models. Yet, in the context
of smart meters one interviewee pointed out that “in the context of trying
to get many of those actors to invest on low-carbon technology, the whole
smart metre rollout… Government now needs to intervene to get anything to
happen” (UK1, Research). It seems then the government is less willing to
intervene in the regulatory process to favour renewables than before.
6. Discussion
Both Germany and the UK are attempting ambitious energy transi-
tions in which renewable energy technologies play a leading role [83].
Our empirical analysis sheds light on the extent to which the associated
system changes are understood to be disruptive and how disruption
may be portrayed diﬀerently in the two countries (for a summary, see
Table 3). We argue such a focus on disruption is important to identify
the eﬀects of energy transitions beyond CO2 emissions, i.e. for policy
makers to recognise also non-technological elements of transitions, and
explicitly address questions around just transitions and energy de-
mocracy [26,62].
More broadly, this article emphasises the value of connecting a
meso-level focus on disruption with more macro-level systemic devel-
opments. This connection enables a better understanding of how par-
ticular business model or ownership disruptions can inﬂuence broader
systemic change but also how particular types of disruption are inﬂu-
enced by wider system developments, which has been recognised as an
important area for further development for sustainability research more
generally [48,67,49–51].
When thinking about the broader governance implications of dis-
ruption in Germany and the UK, two interrelated issues stand out –
ownership and actors and regulation– and how these may inﬂuence the
rate, direction and acceptance of disruption. Ownership and the emer-
gence of new actors was identiﬁed as the key diﬀerence between the
two countries. New actors have driven the ﬁrst electricity disruption in
Germany, while new actors have not had a signiﬁcant impact on the UK
energy transition. The role of actors is crucial in the overall disruption
pertaining to (a) how new business models and markets unfold, and (b)
the degree to which regulation is ﬂexible to allow technological and
business model disruption, and is disruptive in itself in destabilising
existing non-sustainable infrastructures, markets and business models
[39]. While incumbent power producers may have more resources to
advance transitions, we ﬁnd that disruption in ownership and actor
conﬁgurations is more likely to support changed beliefs and practices.
This is supported by Kelsey and Meckling [131], who showed that in-
dependent power producers dominate the renewable electricity sector
in Europe and the United States, inﬂuenced by market eﬀects of tech-
nology disruption. Decentralised energy transitions have been argued to
reshape political power structures [132].
Our ﬁndings, however, show the dominance of incumbent power
producers in the UK energy transition. In Germany, the emergence of
new energy system actors and commitments to ideas of actor diversity
contrasts with the narrower range of actors integrated in decision-
making and regulatory processes in the UK. In particular, the rise of the
Table 3
Summary table of German and UK energy system disruption in 2017.
Disruption Germany UK
Dimensions
Technology • Decentralisation of energy supply through solar and onshore wind,
plus grid challenges (1st electricity disruption)
• Disruption through digitisation and storage anticipated (2nd electricity
disruption)
• Disruption through electric vehicles and power to heat anticipated
(cross-sectoral disruption (3rd))
• Substantial growth of wind power, mainly large-scale oﬀshore wind
• Grid challenges caused by intermittent supply including voltage issues
• Some see smart meters as a precondition of a ‘second wave’ disruption
(potential 2nd electricity disruption)
Ownership & actors • Broadening of ownership (e.g. cooperatives, farmers and citizens) in
renewables (1st electricity disruption)
• Increasing role of the consumer & various new actors from non-energy
domains, including start-ups and IT sector (2nd electricity disruption)
• Ownership of German companies in electro-mobility production
potentially challenged by competitors (e.g. in China and USA) (3rd
cross-sectoral disruption)
• Still dominated by ‘big six’ suppliers
• Minimal role for community energy or consumers as yet, while government
strategy for community energy exists
Markets & business
models
• Disruption in business models of incumbent electricity suppliers
leading to signiﬁcant revenue loss (1s electricity disruption t)
• Search for new service-based business models based on close consumer
contact (2nd & 3rd disruption)
• Potential importance of business models based around ‘platform’
economy (2nd & 3rd disruption)
• Despite renewables expansion still largely based around conventional
business models by large incumbent suppliers
• Consumers mainly staying in a passive role
Regulation • Increased information-sharing and collaboration between network
operators (1st electricity disruption)
• Lack of adjusted regulatory frameworks acting as potential barrier to
further disruption (2nd electricity disruption)
• Regulation moving too slowly in relation to cross-sectoral
developments (3rd cross-sectoral disruption)
• Electricity market reform and capacity market
• Signs of disruption 2010–2015, later diminished
• Regulatory barriers to more consumer involvement
• Signiﬁcant challenges faced by OFGEM in regulating the operation of
National and distribution Grids
Status • Three waves of disruption:
o ﬁrst electricity disruption has already occurred (with disruption on
all four dimensions)
o second electricity disruption and cross-sectoral disruption expected to
take place, with potential regulatory and other barriers
• While experiencing technical challenges at the grid level and rapid growth
in renewable energy, the UK has not undergone a signiﬁcant disruption;
business models and ownership models have not been radically changed;
centralised supply paradigm remains in place.
• Potential early moves to empower consumers and expected regulatory
reforms (2nd electricity disruption).
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cooperative movement and prominent role of community energy in
driving the energy transition in Germany is frequently highlighted;
while in the UK, similar initiatives [126] have not yet disrupted the
energy system. Thus, we can distinguish between an incumbent-led in-
cremental energy transition in the UK and a new-entrant-led disruptive
energy transition in Germany [83], the latter resulting in the ﬁrst wave of
electricity disruption. That said, many interviewees also highlighted
high resistance to further cross-sectoral disruption in Germany, parti-
cularly in relation to e-mobility due to the strong automotive industry
attempting to slow down further waves of disruption.
Another key ﬁnding from our interviews is that regulation is inﬂu-
enced more by wider (sometimes not directly related) policy and poli-
tical commitments than by ostensibly targeted decisions [93]. Con-
sideration, therefore, should be given to the extent to which the wider
direction and rate of change in new business models or technological
innovation are inﬂuenced by economic or technological constraints and
decisions taken by cooperatives or particular ﬁrms. If attention is re-
stricted simply to actors and forms of ownership that directly constitute
the regulatory environments themselves, then key factors may be
missed in understanding wider potentialities for disruption of the un-
leashing of new business models.
The relative timing of the transitions in Germany and the UK is a
possible explanatory factor in how diﬀerent dimensions of disruption
are visible. Germany's low-carbon energy transition was kick-started in
1990 with inﬂuential policies to follow: technology-speciﬁc policies set
in motion in 1990 and feed-in-tariﬀs enacted from 2000 onwards
[95,94,133]. While the UK had introduced the Non-Fossil Fuel Ob-
ligation (NFFO), it had relatively little impact on the growth of new
low-carbon generating capacity [134]. Given Germany's early lead,
there is a sense that incumbent companies were caught oﬀ guard in
terms of the momentous changes that have ensued [135]. Incumbents
in the UK may have observed such changes and sought strategically,
during 2010–2015, to preserve their position through signiﬁcant lob-
bying activities.
Although the UK has not experienced the range of technical, own-
ership and actor, business model, or regulatory changes akin to the ﬁrst
electricity disruption in Germany, this has not aﬀected its climate
change mitigation targets. The Committee on Climate Change [136]
reports that decarbonisation of the electricity sector has progressed well
[136]. Indeed, if CO2emissions reduction is the only criterion for jud-
ging an energy transition, then deeper forms of institutional ‘disruption’
may at least initially not be necessary. However, caution is needed here,
since the cost-scale relationship in UK renewable energy resource
curves are generally (and overall) signiﬁcantly more favourable than
those in Germany [137–140]. So, this may mean that – all else being
equal – geophysical conditions may enable similar levels of progress to
be made in decarbonising the UK electricity supply for a lower level of
institutional disruption than in Germany [81]. If so, the degree to which
this may be a factor will relate to the precise form of the resource curves
and will be subject to change as the transition proceeds. Either way,
however, the overall pattern suggests that multiple values and moti-
vations are inﬂuential beyond just the rationale of reducing
CO2emissions. This relates again to issues of ownership and actors and
questions regarding the democratic implications of climate change
mitigation strategies.
The UK not experiencing a ﬁrst electricity disruption akin to
Germany does not necessarily mean that a second electricity disruption
towards the empowerment of consumers, to advance more socially just
energy transitions, is blocked. Indeed, the UK has progressed with di-
gitisation through its ongoing Smart Meter rollout with the intention of
putting consumers “at the heart” and in control of their energy and
eﬃciency measures [141]. However, so far such eﬀorts have been lar-
gely rhetorical beyond the installation of the meters [142,124]. Ger-
many on the other hand is noted as being a laggard in this regard and so
far Smart Meters are destined for big energy users rather than smaller
consumers [143]. Thus, there is not necessarily a linear progression in
the waves of disruption, and future action may not be constrained by an
absence of certain forms of earlier disruption.
While disruption is certainly a buzzword that many governments
are getting behind, critical thought should be given by policy makers
regarding what is meant by disruption, what kind of disruption should
be promoted on the basis of meeting environmental and social sus-
tainability goals, and with what implications – and doing so by being
guided by the distinction of its diﬀerent dimensions. In particular, ex-
plicit attention needs to be paid to ownership and actors as well as
business models and markets, because they link with social issues in the
distribution of the beneﬁts and costs of the energy transition and are,
thus, of key importance to sustainability transitions. That is, ensuring
diversity and supporting new actors may be a crucial, yet under-re-
cognised, part of ensuring the social sustainability of energy transition
processes. In addition, such actor diversity may also accelerate the
achievement of the environmental targets set for energy transitions.
Lockwood [144] notes the importance of supporting ‘new constitutions’
of actors to drive transition processes, where established actors are
unlikely to alter practices at a suﬃcient pace to bring about system-
wide change. Leaving old actors in place is, thus, likely to lead to re-
sistance through lobbying that could derail low-carbon transition pro-
cesses. In addition, disruption to the regulatory landscape through a
greater diversity of actors involved in the policy process seems to be a
crucial factor.
The kinds of comparative insights emphasised above highlight the
value of exploring energy transitions through the lens of ‘dimensions of
disruption’. At an analytical level, the disruption lens lends itself to an
eﬃcient yet nuanced comparison of how energy transitions diﬀer
without recourse to the detailed narratives often utilised in sustain-
ability transitions research. The disruptive lens can assist policy dis-
cussions that deliberate more carefully about, not only the rate of
CO2reduction that is required, but also how particular technological
preferences and policy support can inﬂuence changes in ownership and
business models, and vice versa. This opens up diﬀerent constituencies
to attend to and discuss, for example, what types of ownership and
business models are desirable. A focus on the disruptive consequences
of energy transitions can also contribute towards more foresight and
planning in managing the wider eﬀects of low-carbon energy transi-
tions, and involving considerations of how certain actors may be
harmed by transitions, and how to manage the negative consequences
of transitions through speciﬁc policy responses.
It has been noted that more comparative work is needed in the ﬁeld
of socio-technical transitions beyond focus on single case studies [47].
Our approach exploring four dimensions of disruption oﬀers a
straightforward way of contrasting transitions in diﬀerent contexts
through the lens of disruption, which does not require tracing the
precise sequence of events bringing about socio-technical change, often
required in the co-evolutionary approaches related to the MLP. Thus,
the conceptual approach here can be utilised to compare concisely how
low-carbon transitions diﬀer between contexts, and as a platform for
interrogating policy processes leading to these diﬀerences [145]. In-
deed, our analysis has shown that even in Europe there is great varia-
tion in how low-carbon transition is unfolding and speciﬁcally what
kinds of system dimensions are being disrupted. The latter point em-
phasises the need for literatures on disruption, in turn, to be more at-
tentive to socio-technical perspectives.
The more multifaceted and heterogeneous picture of disruption that
emerges here in relation to just two rather similar countries on the
global stage, urges caution over the visions of a homogeneous natural
force emphasised by Seba [8]. The facts that clean energy and broader
sustainability transitions are urgent and imperative and that there is an
increasing buzz around the global potential of disruption [18,8], should
not be allowed to inhibit appreciation for the importance of apparently
inconvenient and messy levels of complexity and diversity [146]. There
is a risk that neglect for these conditions may impede successful low-
carbon transitions.
P. Johnstone, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 59 (2020) 101287
10
7. Conclusion and policy implications
In this article, we examined the status of low-carbon electricity
transitions in Germany and the UK, in 2017, through four dimensions of
system disruption – technology, actors and ownership, markets and
business models, and regulation – derived from literatures on disruptive
innovation and sustainability transitions. Drawing on 28 interviews, we
found that, in Germany, disruption was viewed by some stakeholders
present within a ‘ﬁrst wave’ of electricity disruption, with changes not
only in technology but also in ownership, business models, regulation
and the emergence of new actors. In contrast, the UK interviewees felt
that the British energy system was yet to experience systemic disrup-
tion, with discussions focusing around regulatory and technological
issues. According to our interviews, Germany was expecting a ‘second
wave’ of disruption in electricity and a ‘new wave’ of disruption
through the coupling of sectors, such as electricity and mobility, in the
near future, something rarely discussed for the UK.
The challenge raised by these issues for policy, with regards to the
four dimensions of disruption, is that disruption as a buzzword is
usually focussed on technology and economic considerations at the
ﬁrm-level. However, our analysis reveals that more systemic forms of
disruption in relation to ownership and actors and regulatory factors
are also important considerations. Policy makers should therefore
consider how ‘new constitutions’ of actors [144] are given suitable in-
stitutional space to be involved in the policy process to enhance the
overall sustainability of a particular energy transition. Insights from the
UK transition suggest that without disruption to the actor networks,
other factors such as new business models may also struggle to emerge,
if regulatory environments are still dominated by a more narrow set of
incumbent players.
The approach taken in this paper oﬀers a relatively clear but ﬂexible
means for comparing on a systemic level what actually constitutes
disruption in particular contexts by explicitly diﬀerentiating between
four dimensions of system disruption. It oﬀers a middle way between
co-evolutionary and complex socio-technical accounts, while main-
taining the systemic vantage point that is missed in ﬁrm-focussed dis-
ruptive innovation literatures. In closing, we argue that empirically-
driven comparative analysis may serve an important role in bringing
about more clarity on how disruption is unfolding in diﬀerent energy
transitions. With the term disruption becoming ubiquitous in energy
policy discussions, ensuring greater clarity in terms of what is meant by
disruption in diﬀerent contexts is an important move to ensure more
robust policy discussions and empirically grounded policy interven-
tions.
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